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Lellos: Rights of Homosexuals to Adopt

LITIGATION STRATEGIES:
THE RIGHTS OF
HOMOSEXUALS TO ADOPT CHILDREN
I.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, and in its most basic form, the family has been
viewed as a sociological entity comprised of a father, a mother and
a child. The legitimacy of this traditional concept of the family has
been challenged most vehemently, however, by gay and lesbian
parents who seek custody of their biological children.
Furthermore, homosexual individuals are increasingly attempting
either to adopt children through agencies, or to adopt the child of a
partner without severing the legal relationship between child and
parent.!
The impetus behind seeking such a co-parenting
arrangement2 by a life-long partner3 is to ensure that the child will
have a suitable parent should any intervening detrimental event
affect the biological parent's ability to care for his or her child. In
addition, a co-parenting arrangement confers rights to a
homosexual partner for the parental role that he or she occupies.4
A co-parent arrangement creates a means through which
homosexual couples may form a unit similar to a traditional
family. In conceptualizing the formation of the traditional family
and in outlining the difficulties encountered in same-sex family
formation, the triangle proves a useful tool.
The traditional view of the family places the husband and wife at
two points at the bottom of the triangle. Marriage, the legal
relationship between the couple, creates the base of the triangle. If
See generally Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E. 2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re
Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
2 The term "co-parent" will be used to describe a situation in which two
homosexual individuals both have legal rights to a child.
3 The term "life-long partner" refers to a homosexual individual who is in a
committed, life-long relationship with another homosexual person.
4 Adams, William E., Jr., Whose Family is it Anyway?
The Continuing
Strugglefor Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 579, 590 (1996) (citing Suzanne Bryant. Second ParentAdoption: A Model
Brief,2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 233,239 (1995)).
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a child is added to the peak vertex, then both sides of the triangle
are formed. It is the legal relationship between the mother and the
child, and the legal relationship between the father and the child
that create the sides of the triangle, thus enabling the completion of
the traditional family and the triangle.
If an equivalent analysis is performed on the non-traditional
family, a family comprised of two homosexual individuals, for
example, the triangle cannot be formed in the same way as it is for
the traditional family. Although it is possible to find a legal
relationship between the child and either or both of the homosexual
parents, the legal relationship between the two partners is lacking.
Thus, although two sides of the triangle may be formed by virtue
of a legal relationship between two same-sex parents and a child,
the base, which in the traditional family unit is formed as a result
of marriage, cannot be formed in a same-sex family. The
traditional inability of same-sex partners to establish a legitimate
legal relationship, such as that reserved for heterosexual couples,
marriage, is the starting point of any challenge, by homosexual
parents, to the traditional concept of the family.
Although same-sex partners may not consummate their families
in the traditional way, through marriage, the ability to adopt
children, either through agency adoption or a co-parenting
arrangement, brings them a step nearer their goal: to create a
legitimate family. These same-sex arrangements are all attempts to
complete the conceptual triangle so that a family may be formed.
However, homosexual individuals have encountered problems in
gaining custody of their own children, adopting the biological
children of a life-long partner, or in adopting children through an
agency. Part II will outline the justifications which have led to state
policies and judicial determinations regarding the rights of
homosexual couples to adopt. Part III will examine the statutory
treatment of adoption of children by homosexual couples, with a
particular focus on the New York adoption statute. Part IV will
examine whether homosexual couples have any constitutional
rights to adopt children under the United States Constitution while
Part V will examine any rights for homosexuals to adopt under
individual state constitutions.
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PAST AND PRESENT JUSTIFICATIONS
STATE ADOPTION POLICIES

FOR

Same-sex couples have increasingly been advocating that law
makers at both the federal and state levels adopt policies that
permit them to form legal families. However, the battle that
homosexual parents are fighting is a difficult one. Not only must
gay men and lesbians overcome historical preconceptions about
homosexual parenting,5 they must also overcome obstacles such as
the inability to marry and the anti-sodomy laws that categorize
them as criminals.6 Homosexual parents have even been deemed
unfit to care for their children, because of the determination that
homosexuality is a form of mental illness.7 Some courts have
questioned whether gay parents have the ability to form the
necessary bond with a child,8 and have concluded that such a bond
can not be created, and have, accordingly, denied a gay man the
opportunity to adopt a child. 9
When determining whether to place a child with a gay parent, the
courts examine the overall environment in which the child will be
raised.10 For instance, courts might disapprove of an environment
wherein the partners are overtly affectionate with one another." In
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., the court denied child custody to a lesbian mother
who was affectionate with her partner in front of her children,
because she chose to publicize her sexual preference, and this
See generally David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial
Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 345 (1994).
6 See Shaista-Parveen Ali, Symposium: The Changing Role of the Family,
Comment, Homosexual Parenting:Child Custody and Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1009, 1030-32 (1989).

See, e.g., In re Matter of Jacinta M., 764 P.2d 1327, 1329 (N.M.Ct.App.
1988) (overruling trial court's determination that homosexuality is an illness and
adequate reason for refusing to place a child with her gay brother).
8 In the Matter of the Appeal Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d
830, 837 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (Howard, P.J., dissenting) (questioning "whether
an appropriate parent-child bond could be created with a bisexual or homosexual
adoptive parent").
9 See id. at 835.
See S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
hid.
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"created an unhealthy environment for minor children."1 2
Conversely, in M.A.B. v. R.B., 3 the court awarded a gay father
custody of his child because the father did not "flaunt" his
homosexuality and was
not affectionate with his partner in the
4
presence of the child.1
In addition, courts have articulated other reasons to justify denial
of an adoption for gay men and lesbians. For example, courts have
held that if a child is placed with a homosexual parent, the child
might be harassed or stigmatized, the child's sexual orientation
might be affected, or the child's moral development might be
harmed.' 5 In particular, one appellate court justified its decision to
deny custody of a child to a lesbian mother because minor children
might "suffer from the slings and arrows of a disapproving
society.' 6 Another court expressed its fear that a child placed with
a homosexual parent might be "exposed to ridicule and teasing by
other children."'17 On yet another occasion, a court went so far as
to state that children should be protected from any increased
possibility that they might become gay.' 8 In addition, courts have
voiced concern for the moral development of children raised by a
homosexual parent.' 9 For instance, in Roe v. Roe, the court
12

Id. at 166-67; see also Puliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 903-04 (N.C. 1998)

(granting order modifying custody against father who was seen in bed with his
partner by his children); In re J.B.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1195 (Ala 1998)
(granting the father modified custody because the mother and her partner openly
"established a two-parent home environment where their homosexual
relationship is openly practiced and presented to the child as the social and
moral equivalent of a heterosexual marriage).
'" 134 Misc. 2d 317, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1986).
4Id. at 331, 510 N.Y.S. 2d at 968-69.
is See S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d at 166; In re J.S. & C, 324 A.2d 90, 97
(N.J. Super. 1974).
'6Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981). The court based this
determination on the fact that the child's mother was living with her lesbian
lover. Id.
17 Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1987) (noting
that while the chancellor below did use the appellant's homosexuality as an
important factor, it was not the only factor used in denying custody).
'8 See, e.g., J.L.P. (H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 867-68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
The court disregarded expert testimony refuting the "seductive nature" of
homosexuality, and its effect on children. Id.
'9 See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
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decided that living with or visiting a gay or lesbian parent may
harm the child's "moral" well being.Y
Courts have based adoption denials on findings that the
community rejects homosexuality, which is evident through the
existence of state sodomy statutes. 2 ' Although a "same sex
relationship is in no way defined by, nor dependent, upon
sodomy," state sodomy statutes criminalize homosexual conduct
and form the basis for denying custody of a child with a gay man
or lesbian.23 For instance, a concurring judge, in Thigpen v.
Carpenter,2 stated that "[tihe people of both Texas and Arkansas
have declared .. .[lesbian sexual conduct] to be so adverse 'to
public morals and policy as to warrant criminal sanctions." 5
Similarly, in Constant A.v. Paul C.A., 26 the court denied expanded
custody of a child to her lesbian mother, because of fear that the
mother might be arrested if she traveled to states with sodomy
laws.27 This was a recognition that in stat~s that have sodomy
laws, homosexuals have been treated as criminals.' Furthermore,
since criminals are often barred from adopting children,
homosexuals cannot adopt whether or not they engage in
homosexual conduct.2 9 Thus, homosexuals are criminalized
simply by virtue of their sexual orientation.:' The Mississippi
Supreme Court expressed its disgust when a homosexual sought
the aid of the court in gaining custody of his fourteen year old
son.3 The court stated that "the conscience of this court is shocked
by the audacity and brashness of an individual to come into court,
openly and freely admit to engaging in felonious conduct on a
20 Id at 693.

21See Pima County, 727

P.2d at 835; S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 165.

22 Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal
ProtectionAnalysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617, 625 (1989).
2Id
at 630-35.
24 730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
25 See Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 514.
27 496 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
Id.at 5.
8 Id.
29 See Ali, supranote 6, at
1031.
0Id.
31 Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So.2d 581 (Miss. 1999).
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regular basis and expect the court to find such conduct
acceptable."32
Because individuals are precluded from marrying a person of the
same-sex and cannot form a family in the traditional sense, some
states prefer to place children with families or heterosexual
couples.
If no family seeking to adopt exists, a child may be
placed with a single heterosexual person rather than a
homosexual.34 The justification behind placing the child with a
single heterosexual person lies in the traditional notion of the
family.35 That is, theoretically, the single heterosexual could
marry and create a family. 36 However, a homosexual person
cannot legally marry a person of the same-sex, and therefore can
never create a family for the child. Only if a homosexual person
chooses to marry a person of the opposite sex, incongruous to her
sexual orientation, may she form a family unit that could, prima
facie, qualify as traditional. In certain cases where homosexuals
have been permitted to adopt children, they have done so under
statutes allowing "single adult persons" to adopt.
III.

STATE ADOPTION STATUTES

Since adoption statutes, procedures and decisions are governed
by the individual states, issues regarding the adoption of children
must be discussed in state specific terms. In the adoption statutes
of forty-eight states, there are no express prohibitions that forbid
lesbians and gay men may not adopt children. 8 In these states the
courts rely on the discretion of the judge to reach a decision

32

Id. at 590 (McRae, J., dissenting).

See Ali, supra note 6, at 1030 n.123.
3 id.
3 Id.
36 id.
37

See infra notes 41 to 44 and accompanying text.
8 The adoption statues in New Hampshire and Florida prohibit the adoption of
children by any "homosexual." See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985),
which provides in pertinent part: "No person eligible to adopt under this statute
may adopt if that person is a homosexual;" N.H. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (West
Supp. 1987) which provides in pertinent part: "Who May Adopt. Specifically as
follows, any individual not a minor and not a homosexual may adopt: ......

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss1/8

6

Lellos: Rights of Homosexuals to Adopt

1997]

RIGHTS OF HOMOSEXUALS TO
ADOPT

167

regarding a proposed adoption by a homosexual.39 In exercising
this discretion, the judge relies on state sodomy statutes as well as
personal biases for justification of any decision.40
Anti-sodomy statutes, a product of history and tradition, prohibit
any oral-genital or anal-genital contact between people of either
the same or the opposite sex. 4 Although not all intimate contact
between people of the same-sex is punished, sodomy particularly
with regard to homosexuality remains "unnatural." 42 Most states
have not precluded homosexuals from adopting children, but this
opportunity has been attained through statutory omission rather
than statutory commission. Thus, most state statutes do not
expressly prohibit homosexuals from adopting children, yet do not
specifically permit them to adopt.4
All states, however, will
permit an unmarried adult (absent questions of the parent's
sexuality) to adopt children, if the adult is determined by the court
to be a fit parent.4 It is under this ambiguous standard that many
courts deny adoptions to homosexuals.45 Parental "fitness" varies
from one state to another.46 This means that although homosexual
individuals may, prima facie, adopt a child, many of their
applications for adoption are denied based on their sexual
orientation. 47
Adoption may be achieved by second parent or co-parent
adoption, agency adoption or private placement adoption.48
Second parent adoption suggests an action brought by a
See Mark Strasser, Fit To Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion and Sexual

Orientation,46 AM. U. L. REv. 841, 890-95 (1997).
40 See supra note 22,

at 630-32.
See Paula A. Brantner, Note, Removing Bricks From a Wall of
Discrimination:State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS
CONST.
L.Q. 495 (1992).
42
Id.at 521-33.
But see supra, note 26.
41

44 STEVEN M. TANNENBAUM, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION

FUND, ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAWV IN

THE 50 STATES 5 (1996).
4 id.

41d.at

47 Id at
8Id

9-13.

8.

at 1.
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homosexual individual to legally adopt his or her partner's
biological or adoptive child. 49 Agency adoption is the adoption of
a foster child that has been placed in the care of a homosexual
individual or individuals.50 In each of these types of adoptions,
determinations of parental .fitness are made before an adoption is
granted. 5'
The general adoption procedure is similar in most states. 2 The
process begins when a person seeking to adopt a child files a
petition with the appropriate court.53 The court then examines the
evidence presented by the state's child welfare agency. 54 Such
evidence generally includes an investigation of the home
environment of the child and the child's upbringing.5 5 Once the
petition for the adoption is filed, either relatives of the child or the
state may contest the adoption. 56
To determine whether a petition for an adoption should be
approved, courts generally use one of three tests: 1) best interests
of the child;57 2) adverse impact;58 or 3) nexus test.5 9 The first of
these tests examines the individual circumstances of the child in
order to determine what is in the "best interests of the person to be
49 STEVEN M. TANNENBAUM, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION
FUND, ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW IN

THE 50 STATES 5 (1996).
50

Id.at4.

51 id.
52

Id.at 1.

53 id.

STEVEN M. TANNENBAUM, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION
FUND, ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW IN

THE50 STATES 1 (1996).
55 id.

5 Id.
57 See William E. Adams, Jr., Whose Family is itAnyway? The Continuing
Struggle for Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEW ENG. L.

REV. 579, 600 (1996).
58 See Jeffrey S. Loomis, Comment, An Alternative for Children inAdoption
Law: Allowing Homosexuals the Right to Adopt, 18 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 631, 635
(1992).
59 See Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion and Sexual
Orientation, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 841 (1997); Jeffrey S. Loomis, Comment, An
Alternative to Placementfor Children in Adoption Law: Allowing Homosexuals
the Right to Adopt, 18 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 631, 632 (1992).
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adopted."60 The adverse impact test considers the possible effect
of any purported conduct or abnormal circumstances on the child,8 '
which must be demonstrated through a "clear and convincing
manner." m If the courts use the adverse impact test, they will
generally not preclude a homosexual parent from obtaining
custody of a child merely because the parent is homosexual, unless
it is demonstrated that his or her sexual orientation has, in fact, an
adverse impact on the child.63 Similar to the adverse impact test,
the nexus test considers the possible effect of any purported
conduct or abnormal circumstances on the child. 6 Thus, if it can
be demonstrated that there is a "clear factual showing of a
connection" between the purported conduct and its "adverse effect
on the well-being of the child. . ." the courts will probably deny
custody.65 In applying this test the courts look to specific evidence
that the child has been negatively impacted by the parent's lifestyle
- i.e. sexual behavior.

6o Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767, 447
N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982) (holding that no single factor is determinative in
evaluating the best interests of the child). See also, lit re Adoption of Charles
B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 886 (Ohio 1990); § 402 Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, 9 U. L. A. 147, 561 (1988) (stating that all "relevant factors" should be
taken into consideration in determining the best interests of the child).
6 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 120 A.D.2d
983, 985, 503 N.Y.S.2d
466, 467 (4th Dep't 1986); Guinan v. Guinan, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831 (3d Dep't
1984).
In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 887 (Ohio 1990).
6 S.E.G. v. R.A.C., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
See also,
Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal

ProtectionAnalysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617,636 n.15 (1989).
6

See Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion and Sexual

Orientation,46 AM. U.L. REV. 841, 861 (1997); Jeffrey S. Loomis, Comment,
An Alternative to Placement for Children in Adoption Law: Allowing
Homosexuals the Right to Adopt, 18 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 631, 635-37 (1992).

6 Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Beck, J.,
dissenting).
66See Kathryn Kendell, Sexual Orientation and Child Custody, TRIAL, Aug.
1999, at 43.
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In New York, the courts apply a hybrid of the "best interests of
the child" and nexus tests. 67 However, the application of the test is
far from uniform because the lack of clear-cut guidelines, which
indicate the sort of parent or environment that would be in the best
interests of the child. Thus, the outcome is based on the personal
determinations and the discretion of the judge.68 One scholar noted
that notwithstanding social science studies, which indicate that the
sexual orientation of the parent have little effect on children,
judges continue to use it as a basis for their decisions. 9 Thus, a
judge's personal biases may preclude a homosexual couple from
adopting a child even if the couple is as capable of nurturing and
caring for a child as is a heterosexual couple.
An important aspect of an adoption is that it often involves the
termination of the biological parent's rights to her child. In the
area of second-parent adoption, this termination of parental rights
may cause problems. 7' Specifically, for homosexual couples, the
adoption of a biological parent's child by his or her partner will, in
72
states, sever the parental rights of the biological parent.
most
New York, however, has allowed the life-long partner of a

67 STEVEN M. TANNENBAUM, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION
FUND, ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW IN

THE50 STATES 10(1996).
6 Id.
69
70

See Kendell, supra note 66, at 42.
See N.Y. DOM REL § 110 (McKinney 1998) which provides in pertinent

part: "Who may adopt; effect of article [a]n unmarried person or an adult
husband and his adult wife together may adopt another person." See also
STEVEN M. TANNENBAUM, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND,
ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW IN THE 50

STATES 2 (1996).
7' N.Y. DOM. REL. § 110 (McKinney 1998); See also Matter of Jacob, 86
N.Y.2d 651, 656, 600 N.E.2d 397, 398, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716,717 (1995).
72 However, the highest state courts in New York, Vermont and Massachusetts
have expressly allowed homosexuals to adopt the children of their partner
without the parental rights of the partners being severed. See, e.g., In re
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); Adoption of Tammy, 619
N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, In re Dana, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 655, 660
N.E.2d 397, 341, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716, 721 (1995); see also STEVEN M.
TANNENBAUM, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, ADOPTION BY
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW IN THE 50 STATES 2-4

(1996).
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homosexual to adopt the biological children of his partner without
severing the parental rights of the biological parent.73
In New York, the law regarding adoption is found in section 110
of the Domestic Relations Law, which states that "an unmarried
person or an adult husband and his adult wife together may adopt
another person."7 4 Although the statute does not explicitly grant
homosexuals the right to adopt, homosexuals are afforded that
right under the "adult unmarried person" language. 75 Conversely,
there is no explicit statement in the statute that prohibits
homosexuals from adopting children individually. 7 However,
with reference to married couples, the statute employs the word
"together" indicating that in any marriage, both spouses must
consent to the adoption of a child.77 In a same-sex relationship, the
impossibility of achieving marital status renders moot the point of
whether both "spouses" agree to an adoption.
Although New York's Domestic Relations Law section 110
permits homosexual individuals to adopt children, a judge must
still determine that such an adoption is in the best interests of the
child.78 Section 114 states that "if satisfied that the best interests of
the adoptive child will be promoted thereby, the judge shall make
an order approving the adoption and directing that the adoptive
child shall thenceforth be regarded and treated in all respects as the
child of the adoptive parent or parents." The judge is only guided
by precedent in making the "best interests of the child"
determination. For instance, in In re Adoption of Evan,O the court
granted an adoption to the partner of a lesbian mother."' The court
In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 667, 660 N.E.2d 397, 407, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716,

724 (1995) (finding that the New York statute was "designed as a shield to
protect new adoptive families, never intended as a sword to prohibit otherwise
beneficial intrafamily adoptions by second parents").
74 N.Y. DOM. REL § 110 (McKinney 1998).
75id.
76 Id.

7 See, e.g., In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d at 656, 660 N.E.2d at 398, 636 N.Y.S.2d at
717
78 (1995).

N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 110:3 (McKinney 1998).
7 N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 114 (McKinney 1998).
w
Misc. 2d 844,583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. New York County 1992).
81 153
d. at 852,583 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
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found that if the couple remained together, the child would benefit
emotionally. 2 Furthermore, regardless of whether the couple
remained together or separated, the child's relationship with each
parent would be a relationship sustained by the "ongoing, legal
recognition of an approved, court ordered adoption. 83 Indeed,
"the purpose of adoption is uniformly seen as promoting the
welfare of the child,"
and provides "a means of establishing a real
84
child."
a
for
home
Once an adoption is found to be in the best interests of the child,
homosexual couples must then overcome the obstacle presented by
section 117 of New York's Domestic Relations Law. is the
severance of the parental rights upon the adoption of the child by
the partner.85 Section 117 of the New York's Domestic Relations
Law states that "after the making of an order of adoption the
natural parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of all
parental duties... [and] shall have no rights over the adoptive child.
..,86 Literal interpretation of this section indicates that parental
ties to the child are severed when the child is adopted by another
person. However, the statute recognizes one exception, which
when applicable, preserves parental rights when the child is
adopted.87
The stepparent exception found in section 117(1)(d) states that
"when a natural or adoptive parent, having lawful custody of a
child, marries or remarries and consents that the stepparent may
adopt such child, such consent shall not relieve the parent.. .of any
parental duty toward such child." 88 A literal reading of subsection
(1)(d) indicates that the exception is narrow and applies only to a
stepparent. 89 By virtue of a marriage to the parent of the child, the
partner attains the status of stepparent and may adopt the child
82

Id. at 846, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (noting that the child "is part of a family unit

that
has been functioning successfully for the past six years").
8
3Id.at 847, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 572, 331 N.E.2d 486,
489, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511,515 (1975).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 1998).
86 Id.
87
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(d) (McKinney 1998).
8Id.
89

Id.
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without severing the original parental bond." In recognizing the
parental exception, the court in In re Adoption of Caitlin and
Emily,91 held that "the situation presented in same-sex adoption
cases. . .is analogous to a stepparent adoption insofar as the
biological mother's position is concemed."' '
However, because a same-sex couple cannot attain the legal
status conferred by marriage, the stepparent exception, read
literally, will not apply.93 Only if courts expand the definition of
family to include same-sex couples who are committed to a longterm relationship may the exception in section 117(l)(d) be
invoked. Indeed, in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Company,94 the
New York Court of Appeals allowed the homosexual partner of a
deceased man to remain in the rent-controlled apartment in which
he and his partner had lived for ten years.95 The court held that
"the term 'family' should not be rigidly restricted to those people
who have formalized their relationship by obtaining.. .a marriage
certificate."' ' Rather, today's "reality of family life.. .[views the
family as].. .two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is longterm and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment
and interdependence. '97 If the courts nationwide were to adopt the
view espoused by the Braschi court, then same-sex couples would
not be precluded from attaining legal family status or from
adopting children. 98

9od.

91 163 Misc.2d 999, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Faro. Ct. Monroe County 1994).

Id.at 1005, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 839 (analogizing the New York statute with the
Vermont statute the court notes that the issue of same sex adoption is not
addressed).
93 See supra, note 73 and accompanying text.
9474 N.Y.2d 201,543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).

996 Id. at 211,543 N.E.2d at 54,544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
97

id.
id.

98 Each partner in a same-sex relationship would be able to adopt the children
of his or her partner without severing or disrupting the biological bond between
the child and its parent. In New York, the adopting partner would be treated as a
stepparent and § 117(1)(d) of the Domestic Relations Law would apply. See
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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In New York, an adult unmarried person may adopt a child
without regard to sexual orientation under the "single person"
language of section 110 of the New York adoption statute."9
Furthermore, the New York Court of Appeals has held that a gay
or lesbian parent need not relinquish his or her legal rights to the
child when further rights to the child are granted to a partner.'00
The New York view is, however, unconventional.' 0 '
New York courts are mandated to place great significance on the
best interests of the child.'0 2 If a child is well-provided for and
nurtured in a same-sex household, the courts will probably allow
the child to remain in that household, and allow the same-sex
partner of a biological parent to adopt the child.'0 3 Returning to
the introductory concept of the family unit as a triangle, the legal
relationship between the biological parent and the child would
remain intact.
The adopting partner would have a legal
relationship with the child, as would the biological parent. The
only legal relationship required to complete the triangle would be
the legal relationship between the two homosexual partners. Thus,
even in progressive states such as New York, the triangle, even
today, would lack its base.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text. See also, In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d
651, 655, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (1995).
'00 In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d at 665-66, 660 N.E.2d at 403-04, 636 N.Y.S.2d at
722-23.
1'0 In addition to New York, the highest courts in Vermont and Massachusetts
have allowed the biological parents to retain the parental bond while granting
second-parent adoption rights to the gay or lesbian partner. See In re Adoption
of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (finding the adoption by the biological

mother's same-sex partner was in the best interest of the child). See also In re
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (finding it was not in the
legislature's intent to terminate the natural parent's relationship with the child
when the natural parent is one of the parties in the adoption proceeding). Id. at

321.
'02 See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 70 (McKinney 1998). Section 70 provides in
pertinent part: "[T]he court shall determine solely what is for the best interest for
the child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness..."; Bennett v.
Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 544, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823
(1976); Boatwright v. Otero, 91 Misc. 2d 653, 655, 398 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392

(Fam. Ct Onondaga Co. 1977).
103 In re Adoption of Caitlin, 163 Misc. 2d 999, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835
(Fain. Ct.

Monroe County 1994); In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 N.E.2d 397, 636
N.Y.S.2d 716 (1995).
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FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. DUE PROCESS

Under the Fifth and Fourteenth0 4 Amendments of the
Constitution, both the federal government and state governments
are precluded from depriving any person "of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." Due Process is composed of
elements of both procedural and substantive due process.'1 s The
former is comprised of the procedures required when the
government deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property.'
Substantive due process questions the government's motivation
behind depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.' 07 Issues
regarding the rights of homosexuals to adopt children require only
substantive due process analysis.'O°
104

U.S. CONST. amend. V, which states in pertinent part: "[No] person shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;" U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, which states in pertinent part: "[N]o State shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
'08 See infra, note 100.
106 Generally, procedural due process requires that the government provide the
individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard when depriving that
individual of life, liberty or property. (U.S. CONST. amend. V). For a detailed
discussion of procedural due process, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law Principles and Policies, Aspen Law & Business (1997) 419; see also,
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (setting out a basic formula to
determine the form of the procedure when there has been a deprivation).
107 The doctrine
of substantive due process places limitations on the
government's power to act and inhibits government action in certain situations
even when the government affords process. Whereas the procedural element has
clearly recognized, case law has read the due process clause as applying
substantive limitations on the government's power to act. See, e.g., Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341-47 (1976).
108 Procedural due process requires a different analysis from that required for
Briefly, procedural due process requires a
substantive due process.
determination of whether there has been a deprivation of life, liberty or property.
If there has not been such a deprivation, due process does not apply and a state
does not have to provide notice and opportunity for a hearing. Conversely, if
there has been a deprivation, a state must provide notice of the deprivation and
an opportunity for a hearing. Thus, the meaning of "deprivation" becomes
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Substantive due process requires that all governmental action, at
a minimum, reasonably relate to a legitimate government
interest. 109 The most rigorous level of review is the strict scrutiny
standard, which requires the government to prove that the law is
necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 1 When
the Supreme Court examines a law using the strict scrutiny
standard of review, the law is presumed to be unconstitutional and
the government has the burden of proving that the method chosen
is the least discriminatory means to achieve the desired end."' The
compelling state interest test applies
in cases dealing with a
2
rights."
fundamental
of
deprivation
The Court has not limited fundamental rights to those rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights." 3 Rather, the Court has used
substantive due process to find that certain fundamental rights,
such as the right to privacy and personal autonomy, are implied in
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.1 4 The Court has
also found that parents have a fundamental right to the custody of
their children." 5 Where procedural due process ensures that prior
to termination of parental rights, the government provides the
affected parent with notice and an opportunity to be heard," 6,
substantive due process requires that the government have a
compelling interest in order to interfere with a parent's

essential. The Supreme Court has held that mere negligence on the part of the
government or government official is insufficient to constitute a deprivation.
See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986) (holding that the word
"deprive" connotes more than a negligent act).
109 See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.
78, 82 (1971).
0
" See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,432-33 (1984).
"' See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
112 Under Equal Protection analysis, strict scrutiny is used when
discrimination
is based on race, religion, and national origin as well as when there is a
deprivation of a fundamental right. See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144
n.4 (1938).
13 U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. The Bill of Rights is
comprised of the first ten
amendments to the Constitution. Id.
t,4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965).
15 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 758-59 (1982); Stanley v.

Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
11 Santosky, 455 U.S. at
758-59.
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fundamental right to custody of his or her children." 7 In Santosky
v. Kramer,"8 the Supreme Court held that parents have a
"fundamental liberty interest. . .in the care, custody and
management of their child."" 9 The Court held that if the
government seeks to terminate the rights of parents, the
government must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that
this action is necessary as a parent's "desire for and right to the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his
or her
20
children is... far more precious than any property right."'
Similarly, when conducting an analysis based on a challenge to
equal protection, the Court uses the compelling state interest
test.' 2' The following section examines the Supreme Court's
analysis of fundamental rights under the equal protection strict
scrutiny standard.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits any
state from "deny[ing] to any person within [the state's] jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."'2 Although at first glance it
seems as though the equal protection clause applies solely to the
states, the Supreme Court has interpreted the equal protection
clause as applying to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment.'2 3 Thus, equal protection guarantees that neither a
state nor the federal government will enact any law whose effect
might cause
unwarranted discrimination against any group of
124
persons.
At the heart of any equal protection challenge lies the question of
whether the government can point to a sufficiently significant

117
118

Id.

455 U.S. 745 (1982).

"9Id.at 753.
120 Id.at 758-59.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 330, 447 n.7 (1972).
122
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
123Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
124Id.
2
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objective so as to justify the discrimination. '
To establish
whether the government can, in fact, justify discrimination, the
Court will examine the classification or how the government
differentiates between people, the level of scrutiny to be applied to
the governmental action and whether
the government meets its
26
burden under the level of scrutiny.'
The "rational basis test," which is the least burdensome level of
review for the government, requires only that a classification be
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. 12 Thus,
so long as a law is not irrational, it will be upheld.1 28 Under the
rational basis test, the courts examine the end, which the
government aims to meet.' 29 If the desired result is legitimate and
the means is, even minimally, related to the end, the law will be
sustained.' 30 However, the burden of proving that a law is not
reasonably related to the government's intended end, or is wholly
3
irrational, lies with the party challenging the law. ' '
The middle level of review, "intermediate scrutiny," imposes a
higher burden on the governmental action than rational basis
review.132 Under this standard, a law must be "substantially related
to an important government purpose" in order to be upheld.'3
Thus, intermediate scrutiny requires that the law be more than
rational, but less than compelling.' 34 The burden of proving that
the law is substantially related 35to an important governmental
purpose lies with the government.

'25
126

127

Id. at 499-500.

Id.
See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988); U.S.

Retirement
Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980).
28
1 Id.
129 id.
3
1 0 Id.
131Id.
32
1 Id.
133
134

See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1985) (finding that using

sex characteristics often bears no relation to a person's ability to contribute to or
perform in society). See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that a
statute giving a preference to male executors over female executors, with all else
being the same violated the Equal Protection Clause).
'35 Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 106, at 416.
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To determine how the government distinguishes between groups
of people, the law challenged on equal protection grounds must
itself be examined: does the law discriminate on its face, or is the
law facially neutral but have a discriminatory effect?'3 A law,
which is facially discriminatory, may be challenged directly on
equal protection grounds.' 3 7 However, a challenge to a facially
neutral law requires proof of a discriminatory purpose behind the
enactment of the law in addition to proof of a discriminatory
effect. -9
Furthermore, the level of scrutiny that the Court will employ
depends on the nature of the alleged discrimination. '"
For
instance, an infringement of a fundamental right will warrant strict
scrutiny and to prevail, the government will be expected to show
that the method chosen is the least discriminatory or injurious
means of achieving a compelling interest.' 40
Similarly,
discrimination based on characteristics such as race, national origin
or alienage have all been held by the Supreme Court4 as requiring
that the government prove a compelling state interest.' '
Thus, the Court examines the constitutionality of both the end
that the government aims to meet, as well as the means employed
to achieve that end. 42 If the Court uses strict scrutiny, the
government must demonstrate that the particular objective behind a

' See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that when a statute
contains express racial classifications the fact of equal application does not
minimize the heavy burden of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding that there was no reason for a San
Francisco ordinance giving authority to the Board of Supervisor to refuse
consent to operate certain laundries, but to harass the city's Chinese population).
1 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect).
'38 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976).
39

1

Id.

,40 See U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating
that the judiciary will defer to the legislature unless there is discriminatioli

against a discrete and insular minority or infringement of a fundamental right).
141 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985).
142 id.
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law serves a compelling state interest and that a 4less
discriminatory
3
exist.1
not
does
objective
the
means of achieving
With regard to discrimination based on a fundamental right,
equal protection requires that the government prove a compelling
state interest. For instance, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 44 the Court
applied the compelling state interest test under the equal protection
clause to hold that an Oklahoma statute, requiring the sterilization
of three time offenders of crimes of moral turpitude, was
unconstitutional because
"[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."'' 45
Protection of a fundamental right under due process and
protection of the same under the equal protection clause is similar
in that the government has the burden of proving that it had a
compelling state interest in enacting a law. However, the former
requires the government to prove that it is sufficiently justified in
enacting the law, whereas the latter requires that the disparate
classifications between people, as to a particular right, are
sufficiently justified.
The issue of whether a right is fundamental is critical, since it is
determinative of the level of scrutiny the Court will use in
analyzing an infringement of that right. For instance, any
infringement of a fundamental right must meet strict scrutiny.
However, in deciding that a right is fundamental, the Court must
interpret the Constitution. It can be argued that fundamental rights
are those explicitly included in the text of the Constitution.
However, it can also be argued that it would have been impossible
for the framers to explicitly include all the possible fundamental
rights within the text of the Constitution. If a right is not expressly
given fundamental right status in the text of the Constitution, the
Court may look at rights, which are "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition" to determine whether they are indeed
fundamental. '46
Once the Court determines that a right is fundamental, the
analysis proceeds to an examination of whether there has been an

143

id.

'44316
U.S. 535
14 5 Id. at 541.
146

(1942).

See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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infringement of that right. In Zablocki v. Redhail,47 the Supreme
Court held that the "directness and substantiality of the
interference" must be considered in order to determine whether
that right has been violated. 14
Furthermore, a determination by the Court that a right is
fundamental and that it has been infringed, requires that the
government prove a compelling state interest to justify the
infringement.' 4 9 In addition, the government must prove that the
means selected to carry out the particular law is the least restrictive
alternative in achieving the intended end.'5
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether there is a
right to the adoption of children, states confer the right to adopt
through state legislation.51 If state legislation draws a clear line
between homosexuals and heterosexuals, i.e., the former group is
precluded from adopting, whereas the latter group is not, an equal
protection claim may arise. Since homosexuals have not been held
to be a suspect class, courts apply a lower level of scrutiny.'52
Although statutes reviewed under rational basis are usually
upheld, theoretically, if a homosexual person is able to show that
the statute is irrational because it is based on unsupported
justifications and stereotypes, the statute may be held to be
irrational and therefore unconstitutional.' 3 On the other hand,
states may justify the classification by claiming that allowing
heterosexuals to adopt promotes the states' interest in preserving
the family. Even if single heterosexuals are permitted to adopt,
where single homosexuals are not, the state may justify such
147 434

U.S. 374 (1978).

Id.at 387.

8
49

See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
'wSee Chemerinsky, supra note 106, at 640-44.
' 5 1Karla J.Starr, Adoption by Honosexuals: A Look at Differing State Courts'
Opinions, XX ARIZ. L. REV. 1497, 1498-99.
152 See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Woodward v.
1

United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ben Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454 (7th Cir. 1989).
,53 Jeffery G. Gibson, Lesbian and Gay Prospective Adoptive Parents: The

Legal Battle, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 7, 10 (1999) (noting that "currently Florida and
New Hampshire are the only two states that categorically prohibit lesbians and

gay men from becoming adoptive parents").
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distinction with an argument that a single person may create a
family through marriage. The single homosexual, however, unable
to marry a person of the same-sex, may not create a family.
In Florida and New Hampshire, where gay men and lesbians are
expresly- prohibited .from adopting children, an equal protection
challenge might possibly succeed. In New Hampshire, the law,
unchallenged over the past 9 years, prohibits homosexuals from
adopting because they are considered to be "unfit."' 5 4 A
homosexual needs only to prove that the adoption statute is not
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest; that there
is no rational basis for the distinction between homosexual and
heterosexuals as parents; and, homosexuals are equally fit to be
parents of children.'55 Homosexuals who wish to adopt under the
Florida adoption statute may make a similar challenge.' 56
Challenging state adoption statutes under the Federal
Constitution is difficult, not only because the Supreme Court has
not articulated a standard, under which statutes discriminating
against homosexuals should be reviewed, but also because without
a Supreme Court indication that a higher level review should be
used, courts generally use rational basis review. Because the
burden of proof lies with the homosexual challenging the statute, a
state may provide any legitimate interest to support its case, and it
is more likely than not that the legislation would be upheld.
C. FUNDAMENTAL
SPHERE

RIGHTS IN THE FAMILY

In Meyer v. Nebraska, 57 the Supreme Court held that "liberty [as
it is used in the due process clause] denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint, but also the right ... to marry, establish a
home and bring up children."'' l5 The Meyer Court held that certain
'5 STEVEN M. TANNENBAUM, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION
FUND, ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW IN

THE50 STATES 8 (1996).
155 See supra, note 122-35, and accompanying text.
'5 FLA. STAT. CH. 63.042(3) (1997) (stating in pertinent

part: "No person

eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual").
157 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
158 Id. at 399.
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rights in the family sphere, such as the right to marry and the right
to bring up one's children are guaranteed liberties long recognized
to be essential to the pursuit of happiness and may not be interfered
with without passing the strict scrutiny analysis.' 59
At the very beginning of family creation is marriage. The
Supreme Court has held that the right to marry is fundamental and
is protected under the due process clause.'6 Marriage has been
described as the "foundation of the family in our society."' 6 '
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that parents
have the right to have, raise and care for their children. In Meyer
v. Nebraska, ' the Supreme Court held that the right to raise
children is a liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'3 Thus "custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents."'" The Court reaffirmed the fundamental right
of parents to the "care, custody and management of their child" in
Santosky v. Kramerr' where it held that the interest of the parents
cannot be severed "completely and irrevocably" without due
process.'5 6 Because choices involving family matters are critical to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,' 67 the Court
has made clear that "a parent's desire for and right to
'companionship, care, custody and management of his or her
children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.""
Thus, parental rights should not be terminated
'9Id. at 399-400.
'ro Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (stating "[t]he freedom to marry

has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil
rights
of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival").
161 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,386 (1978).
' 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
'63d. at 399.
64 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

' 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982).
'aIdat 747-48.
'6Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
,r'
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
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unless the state can prove by clear and convincing evidence both
that the parents are unfit and the child's best interests would be
best served if the parental rights were terminated.
The Supreme Court has indeed recognized that the Constitution
protects the rights of the family as a unit. 169 In addition, the
Supreme Court has held that the family is afforded the right to
privacy, free from governmental intrusion.1 70 For instance, in
Griswold v. Connecticut,17' the Court held that a law prohibiting
married couples from using contraceptives was violative of the
right to privacy. The Court determined that "specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one ....
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . protec[t] against all
governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life."' 72 In addition, the Griswold Court recognized
the sanctity of the family created through marriage, by affording
the family "a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights. 1 73
Further, in Eisenstadt v. Baird 174 the Court explained that
although the right of privacy inhered in the marital relationship,17r
the "right of privacy ...is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision
' 76
child."'
a
beget
or
bear
to
whether

16 9 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
170
Id. at 499. 'This court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice

in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S.. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
171 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172 Id. at 484-485.
73

Id. at 486.
U.S. 438 (1972).
75 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
176 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972);
see also, Casey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (holding that "the decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of... constitutionally
protected choices").
'

'74 405
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Thus far, it is evident that the Supreme Court has taken a step by
step approach in finding that the right to privacy is fundamental in
family and reproductive autonomy, and extends to the family as a
unit as well as to individuals, however, the right to privacy is
limited. In Bowers v. Hardwick,"' 7 the Court refused to recognize
that the fundamental right to privacy extends to homosexual
sodomy, even if the act is committed in the home.178 The Court
distinguished the right to privacy as protected in previous cases"
from the right of homosexuals to engage in acts of homosexual
sodomy. 80 The Court could not find a "connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual
activity on the other."'18 ' Disinclined to find new fundamental
rights in the due process clause, the Bowers Court stated that "there
should be great resistance to expand the reach of [the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] particularly if it
requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be
fundamental."' Although the Supreme Court has recognized the
right to privacy as a fundamental right implied within the Bill of
Rights, it has limited its application to that which seemingly
preserves the morality of the nation.
Under equal protection principles, the protection of a
fundamental right requires the government to prove a compelling
state interest in infringing the right and that a less restrictive
alternative in achieving the desired end was unavailable. In
Bowers, there was no challenge brought on equal protection
grounds, so the issue regarding the level of scrutiny to be used in
challenges based on sexual orientation was not addressed.' Thus,
the Supreme Court has not, to date, ruled on the level of scrutiny to
17478 U.S. 186 (1986).
78 Id at 195-96.

179 Il at 190-91.
180Id

Id. at 191.
" 2 Id. at 195.
181

'mId. at 196.
' Cass R. Sunsfein, Note, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution: A Note
on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1161, 1178 (1988).
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be used in cases regarding discrimination against homosexuals or
bisexuals. 8 However, in Romer v. Evans,8 6 the Supreme Court,
using rational basis review, held that a state constitutional
amendment the purpose of which is to harm a politically unpopular
group, in this case homosexuals, was found per se
unconstitutional. 7 The Romer decision could be the beginning for
future anti-sexual-orientation discrimination cases and a
breakthrough for gays, lesbians and bisexuals in using the courts to
combat such discrimination.
It is not anomalous that the Supreme Court in Romer used a
rational basis level of review. Indeed, most of the decisions in the
United States Courts of Appeals have held that such discrimination
warrants rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny.'88
However, in Watkins v. United States Army, 89 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Nineth Circuit held that discrimination
based on sexual orientation should be subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny.'90 It has been argued that in determining whether
child custody or visitation with a parent involved in a same-sex
relationship is in the best interests of the child, courts should use
the strict scrutiny standard.191
Although the Supreme Court has used strict scrutiny in
discrimination cases based on immutable characteristics such as
185 Id.
'86517

87

U.S. 620 (1996).

Id. at 635.

' See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
classifications based on sexual orientation are not entitled to strict scrutiny).
189 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
190 Id. The case involved multiple appeals, the last of which is relevant for the
present discussion. When Watkins appealed the decision of the district court,
which had decided the case on remand, a divided panel of judges employed
strict scrutiny and held that Watkins' equal protection guarantee had been
violated because the "army regulations [were] not necessary to promote a
legitimate compelling governmental interest." Watkins v. United States Army,
847 F.2d 1329, 1352 (9th Cir. 1988). A full court reviewed the issues raised in
both of the previous cases and held that the army could not bar Watkins from reenlisting by virtue of his homosexuality, and found it "unnecessary to reach the
constitutional issues raised in Watkins II." Watkins, 875 F.2d 699, 704-705 (9th

Cir. 1989).
'9' See supra, note 22 (arguing that same-sex relationship classification require

a strict level of scrutiny review).
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gender, race, national origin and illegitimacy, studies indicate that
9
sexual orientation may not necessarily be such a characteristic.' 2
For instance, bisexuals may be attracted to persons of both sexes,
yet choose to have partners of only one sex.'9 3 Similarly, a person
may be homosexual, but may choose not to have any same-sex
partners or act on an attraction.'9 Thus, it may be argued that
while a homosexual may choose not to associate him or herself
with homosexual circles or enter into same-sex relationships,
people of a particular race or gender do not have the option to
make a comparable choice to disassociate themselves from the
group to which they belong.' 95 Based on this analysis, the courts
may be justified bypassing strict scrutiny when deciding cases of
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Intermediate scrutiny
may be appropriate as homosexuals may be deemed a discreet and
insular minority with a history of discrimination as well as a social
stigma.9
In cases involving a homosexual parent who has been denied
custody of a child, the courts have tried to justify their decisions
based on stereotypes and suppositions that the placement of the
child with the homosexual parent might be harmful to the child.1 97
As examined in Part II, courts have based their decisions on
assumptions that the child might be harassed or stigmatized, the
fear that the child's sexual orientation might be affected, or the
child's moral development might be harmed.'9 3 However, the
Supreme Court in Palmorev. Sidoti'" ruled that such justifications
for custody denials are illegitimate. The Court recognized that
although a child of an interracial relationship might be subjected to
pressures not otherwise present, the Court could not deny custody
19 See, e.g., D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking of Sexual Minorities: The
Tensions Between Gay Politicsand History, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE

915 (1986).
9
1 3 See iL
19 4 See supra, note 22, at 622.
19 5 Id
19
1

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
See supra note 22, at 630; see also, Gibson, supra note 153.

is See supra note 22, at 630.

199 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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of the child based on private biases and the possibility that they
might injure the child.2 The Palmore Court decided that a child
should be punished neither for the circumstances surrounding the
child's birth or parentage nor the legal status of her parents.
Followig this rationale, it can be argued that a court should not
punish the child, by denying its homosexual parent custody with
simply because the parent is homosexual.20 '
Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,20 2 the
Court ruled that the government's fears of student mockery of the
mentally retarded was not a constitutionally sufficient reason to
justify the denial of a zoning permit. 20 3 The Court affirmed the
belief that it is not legitimate under the Constitution for a law to be
based on a group's fear that an event or circumstances might
occur.2 4 Following this rationale, a child in a same-sex family
should not be denied custody with his homosexual parent based on
fears of potential public ridicule. 5
Although it may be argued that homosexuals are analogous to
the mentally retarded in that they have suffered a history of
discrimination and social stigma through no fault of their own, 220 6
the Court in City of Cleburne used the mere rational basis test. 07
At most, the Court's level of scrutiny was slightly more searching
than the traditional rational basis review, and has been termed
'mere rationality with a bite.' It seems unlikely that the Supreme

200

id. at 433.

201 Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that children of unmarried

parents should not be denied benefits afforded to other children).
202 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
20
3 Id. at 449.
204 Id. at 448 (stating that mere negative attitudes, or fears, unsubstantiated by
factors which are properly cognizable in zoning proceeding, are not permissible
bases for treating a home for mentally retarded differently from apartment
houses, multiple dwellings and the like).
2o5 See id.
206 Id. at 461 (stating that the mentally retarded have been subject to a "lengthy
and tragic history of segregation and discrimination that can only be called
grotesque").
207 Id. at 442. The Court stated that "heightened scrutiny inevitably involves
substantive judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the
predicate for such judicial oversight is present where the classification deals
with mental retardation." Id.
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Court will add groups to those, which already warrant intermediate
or strict scrutiny.2 m
A child should not be denied economic and psychological well
being simply because she is in the care of two unmarried adults.
The determination of an application for adoption based on the
marital status of a child's parents is unconstitutional, unless marital
status-bears "an evident and substantial relation to the particular
interests the statute was designed to serve. ' 203 Hence, marital
status should not be weighed in the determination of suitability of
potential adoptive parents.
The Federal Constitution does not grant homosexual couples any
special rights to adopt children. At most, gay men and lesbians
have the right to custody of their children, the right to raise their
children, and even the right to a family. However, homosexuals
have the right to a family provided that family is composed of a
father, mother and a child, that is, a family as it is known in its
most traditional sense. Although gay men and lesbians have
attempted to invoke substantive due process and equal protection
to ascertain recognition of their rights, neither route has proved to
be fruitful."
The United States Supreme Court has yet to define expressly the
level of scrutiny that should be used in examining issues regarding
discrimination against homosexuals. 2 ' The effect of this lack of
guidance on this issue results in the use of the lowest level of
review by the courts, or rational basis review, which merely
requires that the government action be reasonably related to a
legitimate government interest.212 For gay persons challenging a
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Discrimination against gender and illegitimate children is reviewed under midlevel scrutiny; discrimination based on race, national origin, or religion are
reviewed under strict scrutiny. Id.
2o9 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
210 See supra, notes 97-149 and accompanying text.
211 Chemerinsky, see supra note 106, 634. The Supreme Court has note yet

ruled as to whether discrimination based on sexual orientation warrants the
application of intermediate or strict scrutiny. Il
212 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) (finding that it is not the
dominion of the court to second-guess legislative enactments, such review of the
legislature is best made at the polls).
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law which the courts will examine using only rational basis review,
the battle is a difficult one to win because the government need not
demonstrate an actual purpose for the law, but only a conceivable
legitimate purpose.21 3
In additipn, in order to determine whether a right is fundamental,
the Supreme Court has used the most specific interpretation of a
right to examine whether the right is one that is deeply rooted in
the history and tradition of the nation.21 4 If the right is not one,
which has been deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the
nation, it is not fundamental and therefore does not warrant strict
judicial scrutiny. 2 5 For gay men and lesbians, the right to a
"homosexual family" does not constitute a fundamental right. As a
result, the homosexual family unit, because it is unconventional, is
not protected under the Constitution.
V.

RIGHTS OF HOMOSEXUALS TO ADOPT UNDER
STATE CONSTITUTIONS

The federal Constitution provides the minimum rights and
protections, which the states must confer, to an individual. This
means that although the federal Constitution sets out certain
protections, the states may, under their own state constitutions,
provide additional rights to individuals within a state. However, a
state may not offer to an individual less protection under the state
constitution than is afforded by the federal Constitution.
For homosexual couples, protections under state constitutions
may be a more fruitful source of rights. The preceding discussion
indicated that the federal Constitution does not specifically provide
any protection for the gay man or lesbian who wants to adopt a
child. That is not to say that the same is true under a particular
state constitution. Theoretically, a state may, under its state
213

See, e.g., United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166

(1980).
214

See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); Michael H. v.

Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1988).
215 Chemerinsky, see supra note 106 at 638. The Supreme Court has held that
some liberties are so important that they are deemed to be "fundamental" and
that generally the government cannot infringe upon them unless the strict
scrutiny test is met. Id.
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constitution, expressly grant homosexual parents the right to adopt
children. Or, a state may enact a law, which grants legal rights to a
homosexual couple wishing to be married. However, what a state
may not do, for instance, is enact a216law repealing all legislation
providing protection to homosexuals.
If a homosexual couple is denied the right to adopt a child
because either the state's adoption statute expressly precludes a
homosexual person from adopting or the state criminalizes sodomy
and the adoption law, in turn, forbids criminals from adopting
children, the homosexual couple may challenge the adoption law
on a number of theories.
A. The Right to Privacy
A challenge against a state sodomy statute may be fruitful if a
person claims a violation of the right to privacy under the state
constitution. A state may, implicitly or explicitly, guarantee the
right to privacy under the state constitution and may provide more
protection for the individual's right to privacy than does its federal
counterpart.17 In those states which explicitly grant the right to
privacy in their state constitutions, a challenge to the right of
privacy under the state constitution would be stronger than a
similar challenge under the federal Constitution, because the latter
does not explicitly provide privacy guarantees. 2 ' 9 Rather, the right

21

6 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

217

See Paula A. Branter, Removing Bricks From a Vall of Discrimination:

State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.

Q.

495 (1992) (stating that "whether the right to privacy is explicit or implicit,
some states have found their privacy rights more extensive than those found
under the federal constitution").

211 See Sexual Orientation and the Law, Harv. L. Rev. eds., 1989 at 24.

Twenty states explicitly provide for the right to privacy. These are: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maryland, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, West Virginia, Washington, Wyoming. Id.
219 Paula A. Brantner, Removing Bricks Front a Wall of Discrimination:
State
Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 495 (1992)

at 517.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

31

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1999], Art. 8

192

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

to privacy has been implied in the United States Constitution
through judicial interpretation.
An express guarantee to privacy may include the freedom to
make personal choices free from governmental interference. 220 For
instance, in McClosky v. Honolulu Police Department,22' the
Hawaii Supreme Court used the express privacy guarantees under
its state constitution to define the right to privacy as the right to be
free from the disclosure of personal matters as well as the right to
protect important personal decisions from state interference. 22
Thus, it may be argued that the freedom to make personal
decisions without state interference includes the right to engage in
sexual relations, including sodomy.
Certain states retain anti-sodomy statutes, which criminalize
sodomy regardless of whether the act occurs between consenting
adults of the same-sex or of the opposite sex.2m In such states,
homosexual couples are more likely to prevail on a theory
asserting sexual privacy under a state constitutional right to
220 Seee.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (stating that "the right of the
people to

privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed"); CAL. CONST. art. I, § I
(providing in pertinent part that "all people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty ... and privacy"); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (stating that "every natural
person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his
private life except as otherwise provided herein"); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6
(proving that "the right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest"); MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 10 (stating "the right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being
of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest").
221 799 P.2d 953 (Haw. 1990) (holding that Police Department's
policy
requiring drug testing as a condition to employment did not violate the officer's
right to privacy, nor was it an unreasonable search).
222 McCloskey, 799 P.2d at 957.
223 Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia criminalize acts of
sodomy. See, e.g., Sexual Orientation and the Law, note 2 at 9; Comnment,
Future Scope of Minnesota'sRight to Privacy, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 255,
265-66 n. 63 (1989) (explaining that prior to 1962 all fifty states had statutes
prohibiting sodomy.
In 1962 the American Law Institute proposed
decriminalization of private consensual sodomy between adults in its draft of the
Model Penal Code. The Institute's commentators viewed the defining of
sodomy as a crime as "an attempt to coerce private morality rather than an
attempt to prevent harm to individuals or society").
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privacy.2 Therefore, it is important to ascertain whether the state
constitution guarantees a right to privacy, explicit or implicit, and
what the scope of the right is, i.e., what sort of conduct the privacy
guarantee protects. Although the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick,22
held that the federal constitutional right to privacy does not extend
to acts of sodomy, the Court expressly stated that the case before it
did not raise any "question about the right or propriety of state
legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize
homosexual sodomy, or of state court decisions invalidating those
decisions on state constitutional grounds."2' '
The decision in
Bowers did not affect challenges to anti-sodomy statutes under
individual state constitutions.
Indeed, challenges to anti-sodomy statutes under state
constitutions have, in certain cases, been successful and the
statutes have been held to be inconsistent with privacy rights
guaranteed to individuals under their state constitutions. 22 For
example, in Morales v. State,2 the Texas Court of Appeals held
that "if consenting adults have a privacy right to engage in sexual
behavior, then it cannot be constitutional, absent a compelling state
objective, to prohibit lesbians and gay men from engaging in the
same conduct." 9 Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in
2 Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights,
Claims, and Defenses, 2d ed., Michie Publications, 1996 at § 2-7(a) pg. 128.
2s 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2Id.
at 190.
227Jennifer Friesen, supra note 224, at 129.
Laws punishing private sexual conduct have been deemed
inconsistent with state constitutional privacy rights, at least to the

extent that such laws criminalize consensual, non-commercial,
acts in private locations between adults. Other states adhere to the
federal position against finding a right of sexual privacy. The
rationale of most of the constitutionally based decisions protecting
sexual privacy would extend to such rights regardless of sexual

orientation or preference.
Id at 129-30.
826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Court. App. 1993). Plaintiffs brought a declaratory
judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas statute

criminalizing private sexual relations between consenting homosexual adults.
Id.
22-9

d at 204-205.
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striking down a state anti-sodomy statute which criminalized
consensual homosexual sodomy, emphasized that the right to
privacy "has been recognized as an integral part of the' guarantee of
liberty in [the] 1891 Constitution since its inception."
Even in the state of Georgia, whose anti-sodomy statute
prompted the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,231
the Georgia Supreme Court has recently conferred a right to
privacy greater than that enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court.232 In particular, the Georgia Supreme Court found that
sexual activity "conducted in private between adults" is precisely
the sort of activity "that reasonable persons would rank as more
private and more deserving of protection from governmental
interference."3 Thus, the Court concluded that "such activity is at
the heart of the Georgia Constitution's protection of the right of
privacy,"4 and held the anti-sodomy statute to be in violation of
the Georgia State Constitution insofar as it "criminalizes the
performance of private, unforced, non-commercial acts of sexual
intimacy between persons legally able to consent."23 5 The Georgia
Supreme Court is the fifth of the highest level state court to
invalidate the state's anti-sodomy statute,23 6 and may well serve as
a catalyst for other courts across the country to invalidate similar
statutes.2 37
B. The Right To Equal Protection of the Laws

23
23,
232

234

Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
See id.

Powell v. State, 1998 WL 804568, *4 (Ga.).
id.

25Id.
236

at *7.

Sack Kevin, Georgia's High Court Voids Sodomy Law, Nov. 24, 1998

NYT-ABS 16, Sec. A, pg. 4. Additionally, in each state where its anti-sodomy
statute was rejected by the highest court, the state court ruled that their state
constitutions guaranteed more extensive privacy rights than the United States.

Id.

27 Id. The invalidation of the anti-sodomy statute by the Georgia
Supreme
Court had special symbolic meaning for the gay right advocates because the
Georgia court's opinion has "prompted the Untied States Supreme Court to

declare that the United States Constitution does not confer a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in homosexual adoption. Id.
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Another theory of litigation for homosexuals wishing to
challenge an adoption law or an anti-sodomy law, which leads to
their preclusion from adopting children, is the principle of equal
protection of the laws embodied in most state constitutions. 31 If
the law expressly treats different groups of people unequally, then
an equal protection claim may arise. In determining whether a
particular law violates equal protection, courts have adopted the
same three standards of review articulated and employed by the
Supreme Court: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny and strict
scrutiny.2 -9 Thus, whether a claim by a homosexual will prevail
depends largely on the level of review the court chooses to apply to
the state action in question. If a court applies rational basis review,
the plaintiff carries a heavy burden because the state need only
demonstrate that the action taken is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest.m Conversely, if strict scrutiny is
applied, the heavy burden of proof shifts to the state and the state
must prove that the action taken is necessary to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.24 '
Although the Supreme Court has, to date, applied only rational
basis review in examining state action that burdens
homosexuals, - individual states are free to use a heightened level
of review to determine whether state action violates equal
protection. It may be argued that laws treating homosexuals
differently from other persons warrant a higher level of review
4 For instance, not only have homosexuals
than rational basis. m
suffered a history of discrimination, 2 " and political
powerlessness,24 5 homosexuality is in itself an immutable
See, Friesen, supra note 224, at § 3-1.

Z9 See supra, notes 122 to 156 and accompanying
240 See supra,note 127 and accompanying text.

text.

See supra, note 140 and accompanying text.
242Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
See Harris M. Miller, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal
2

Protection Heightened Scrutiny to ClassificationsBased on Homosexuality, 57

S.2CAL.
44 L. REV 797 (1984).
245

Sexual Orientationandthe Law, Harv. L. Rev. eds. 1989 at 10.
Id
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characteristic.2
Since the Supreme Court has found that these
characteristics are subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny, the
state courts may choose to apply heightened scrutiny rather than
rational basis review. If a state court chooses to apply rational
basis review to state action, the challenger of the state action will
probably not prevail. 247 Conversely, if the state courts apply strict
or heightened level scrutiny, then the challenger of the state action
248
has an increased chance of success on an equal protection claim.
C. New York: an example
New York State does not confer on individuals an express right
to privacy under its state constitution. 24 9 Rather, the right to
privacy has been implied in its due process clause, strikingly which
is similar to its federal counterpart. The New York State
Constitution's due process clause states that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, 250
and is applied in much the same way as the federal Constitution. 251
246
247

See Nabozny v. Polesny, 92 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1996).
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.

248

Id.

249

See Hope v. Perales, 150 Misc. 2d 985, 992, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 977 (Sup.

Ct. 1991).
250 Compare, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states that: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part that: "No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... Id.
25, See Burton C. Agata, Individual Liberties, The New York State Constitution
THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (1994) at

88. As in the federal system, substantive due process under New York's
Constitution requires a state to prove that a deprivation of liberty, life or
property be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. The New
York State due process clause has a procedural aspect and a substantive aspect,
as does the federal due process clause. If the deprivation is of a fundamental
right, the courts in New York will require the state to show that the state action
was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Id. See also, People v.
Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). In
Isaacson, the New York Court of Appeals "recognized that higher standards
may be imposed under the state due process clause.., than under corresponding
federal constitutional provisions." Id. at 519, 378 N.E.2d at 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at
718.
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Although the right to privacy under the state constitution has not
been addressed often, one New York court expressly stated that
"the right to privacy [is] guaranteed
by the due process clause of
' 2
Constitution."
State
the New York
Further, the New York State Constitution guarantees to
individuals the equal protection of laws, and provides that "[n]o
person shall be denied equal protection of the laws of [New York]
state." 2- Again, New York's equal protection clause mirrors that
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.24 A
claim arising under the equal protection clause will require a
choice by the state courts with regard to the appropriate level of
judicial review: rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny or
strict scrutiny. Depending on the level of review employed by the
court, an individual may be conferred greater rights than those
granted under the federal Constitution.
However, it is not always necessary for a court to invoke state
constitutional provisions if it can extend the rights given to
individuals under the federal Constitution. For instance, in
invalidating New York's anti-sodomy statute, the New York Court
of Appeals, in a two part decision, applied the federal
constitutional rights of privacy and equal protection.
In
252 Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding that
the failure of the Prenatal Care Assistance Program to provide funding for
medically necessary abortions violated provisions of the New York

Constitution).
2.3 N.Y. CONST. art. 1 § 11. This section provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this
state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race,
color, creed or religion be subjected to any discrimination in his
civil rights by any other person or by firm, corporation, or
institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the

state.
l

254 See, e.g., Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City
of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344,482 N.E.2d 1,492 N.Y.S.2d 522, (1985). In this
decision, the Court of Appeals stated that state equal protection law was
identical to its federal counter part. Id at 360, 482 N.E.2d at 7, 492 N.Y.S.2d at
528.
25 See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d
947
(1980).
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particular, New York's anti-sodomy statute provided that "a person
is guilty of consensual sodomy when he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another person ' ' 56 yet did not punish the same
conduct between two married persons.257 The Court interpreted the
federal,-right to privacy as "[the] right to independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions... undeterred by
governmental restraint"' 8 and found that there was "no rational
basis for decisions such as those made by [the homosexual
defendants] . . . so long as the decisions are voluntarily made by
adults in a noncommercial, private setting. '' 25 9 Although the New
York Court of Appeals ruled that the anti-sodomy statute was
invalid by applying privacy principles, it also held that the statute
violated equal protection.260
The anti-sodomy statute drew a distinction between person's
married and person's unmarried by criminalizing sodomy with
regard to the latter group. 26 ' The Court, using a rational basis level
of review, concluded that the state's objectives in "protecting and
nurturing the institution of marriage" 262 did not have "any
relationship much less rational relationship 2 63 to the prohibitions
set out in the anti-sodomy law. 264
The New York Court of Appeals used the rights granted under
the federal Constitution to overturn New York's anti-sodomy
statute and effectively expanded the right to privacy to include
consensual sexual activity conducted in the privacy of the home.266
However, the Court could have reached the same decision by
invoking the due process and equal protection laws of the New
York State Constitution in its analysis.2
25 6
257

258

NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney Supp. 1999).

Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 483,415 N.E.2d at 937, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
Id. at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949.

259

Id. at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 940, 434
N.E.2d at 944, 434
N.E.2d at 942,434
262 Id. at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 943,434
260 Id.at 493,415
261Id. at 491,415

263

N.Y.S.2d
N.Y.S.2d
N.Y.S.2d
N.Y.S.2d

at 951.
at 955.
at 953.
at 954.

People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947

(1980).
264 Id.
26
5

26

Id. at 479-481.
at 482.

6 Id.
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Another strategy that homosexual couples may explore to adopt
children lies in challenging the definition of family. 267
Traditionally, the family has been deemed to consist of a mother,
father and their children.2m However, homosexuals may attempt to
challenge this traditional view using court decisions which have
expanded the definition of family to include persons who are not
married to each other, but who live in the same household and
share in the responsibilities as does a typical family unit.26 For
example, the New York Court of Appeals in McMinn v. Town of
Oyster Bay, invalidated the definition of family contained in a
zoning ordinance because it violated the due process clause of the
State Constitution. 270 The Court held that a municipality may not
"'limit the definition of family to exclude a household which in
every but a biological sense is a single family' 27' if [the] household
m
is 'the functional and factual equivalent of a natural family."'=
Thus, within the states, homosexuals may challenge the legitimacy
of the definition of the family due to the inconsistencies in its
application. 273
267

See McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544,488 N.E.2d 1240,498

N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985) (affirming the supreme court judgment that declared article
1, section 1, of the Town of Oyster Bay Building Zone Ordinance invalid
because it "prohibits occupancy of a single-family dwelling on the ground that

the occupants are not married... and not related to each other").
268 Id

269 ad

270 McMinn

66 N.Y.2d at 547-48,488 N.E.2d at 1241-42, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
The ordinance defined "family" as :
(a) Any number of persons, related by blood, marriage, or legal

adoption, living and cooking on the premises together as a single,
nonprofit housekeeping unit; or (b) any two (2) persons not
related by blood, marriage, or legal adoption, living and cooking
on the premises together as a single, nonprofit housekeeping unit,
both of whom are sixty-two (62) years of age or over, and residing
on the premises.

Id.
2' Id. at 550, 488 N.E.2d at 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131 (citing City of White
Plains v. Ferraioli,34 N.Y.2d 300, 306, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d

449 (1994)).
Id. (citing Group House v. Board of Zoning & Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266,
272,380
N.E.2d 207,210,408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978)).
273ld
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As illustrated in McMinn, the Court of Appeals in New York
adopted a broad definition of "family" with respect to zoning
ordinances. 4 However, the language in New York's adoption
statute expressly allows a traditional family, "an adult husband and
his adult wife [to] adopt another person, 275 whereas homosexuals
may adopt only as "unmarried persons. '27r Thus, the adoption
statute in New York does not expressly state that homosexuals
have the right to adopt, and does not recognize a homosexual
277
couple as a family.
However, more liberal than in most states, the New York
adoption statute allows a life-long partner of a gay man or lesbian
to adopt the biological child of her partner without severing the
parental blood bond. 8 Moreover, guidelines adopted by the New
York Department of Social Services in 1982 expressly rejected the
denial of applications for adoption made by homosexuals based
solely on their sexual orientation. 9 Homosexuals have, thus,
gained the official administrative support that will facilitate a more
just review of their applications in their goal to adopt children. 280
New York can be viewed as a state with a progressive outlook
towards homosexuals. Not only has the highest state court
expanded the federal constitutional right to privacy but it has
overturned the state anti-sodomy statute. In addition, the state has
enacted adoption legislation that allows homosexuals to adopt
children.2m ' For homosexual couples, New York's approach is
274
275

Id. at 547-48, 488 N.E.2d at 1241-42, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
N.Y. DOM. REL. § 110 (McKinney 1998) (providing in pertinent part: "an

adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his wife together may adopt
another
person").
276
Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Joseph B. Treaster, New York Issues Guidelines on Adoptions for State's
Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1982, at 27 (stating that the regulations for the
State Adoption Service requires that "anyone 18 years of age and older must be
considered as a potential adoptive parent"); See also, Shaista-Parveen Ali,
Symposium: The Changing Role of the Family in the Law, Comment,
Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1009
(1989).
28 0

Id.

2 N.Y. DOM.

REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1998).
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liberal and favorable because it does away with the outmoded
justifications and stereotypes associated with homosexuality.8
For homosexuals living in states that retain anti-sodomy statutes
and/or prohibit homosexuals from adopting children, the
developments in New York law provides an example of the ways
in which litigation strategies that may be used to achieve similar
results in other states.
D. Homosexual rights: recent developments
A recent decision of the Vermont Supreme Court may open the
door for homosexuals to challenge the prevailing norms in.' That
court was faced with a question of whether a state may deny samesex couples the "benefits and protections that its laws provide to
married couples."' The court held that the plaintiffs were equally
entitled to the benefits and protections provided by the state
constitution. 5 It fell short of implementing its mandate, however,
choosing instead to allow the legislature time to "enact legislation
consistent with its constitutional mandate." 6 The practical effect
of this decision is that homosexuals would be able to legally join
together as a family.
Perhaps the most progressive state initiative in conferring to
homosexuals increased rights over those they are granted under the
federal Constitution, was found in a recent Hawaii Supreme Court
case allowing two homosexuals to marry. In Baehr v. Leivin, 7 the
court held that denying same-sex couples access to marital status is
a sex-based classification that is presumed to be
unconstitutional.m
Further, the Circuit Court of Hawaii held that the state failed to
prove that the public interest in the well-being of the child would
22See
23

supra note 279, Shaista-Parveen Ali.
See Baker v. Vermont, 1999 WL 1211709 (Vt. 1999) (reviewing the

constitutionality of the Vermont marriage statutes).
2'2 4

5

1

Id. at *3.
Id. at *57-58.

at *67.
287852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw 1993).
281Id.

"-i

Id at 67.
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be adversely affected by a same-sex mariage.2 89 Thus, the Hawaii
courts created a new status referred to as a reciprocal beneficiary
relationship and is open to all Hawaiian couples who are legally
prohibited from marrying under the state's laws. 2 9 Although the
arrangement did not provide the same sort of favored treatment
afforded to married couples who want to adopt children, 1 it was a
major step in the legal recognition of homosexual families.292
However, this step was nullified by the Hawaiian legislature,
which defeated the equal protection clause of the Hawaiian
Constitution by amending that constitution.2 93 The passage of this
amendment re-validated the Hawaiian marriage statute, which
limited marriage to opposite-sex persons.' Thus, it is clear that
even though the Hawaiian courts were willing to take the steps
necessary to allow homosexuals to join in a family relationship, the
legislature is not quite ready to take that step. 95
VI.

CONCLUSION

Misconceptions about homosexuality and a historical fear that
children raised by homosexual parents will be traumatized,
stigmatized, or raised in an immoral environment have all served
as justifications for denying a gay or lesbian parent the right to

2'9

Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,

1996) (holding that the defendant failed to present sufficient credible evidence
which demonstrates that the public interest in the well-being of children and
families, or the optimal development of children would be adversely affected by
same-sex marriage).

Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian
Family Values by a "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699
290

(1998). The author argues that "since the public hostility to homosexuals in this
country is too widespread to make homosexual marriages a feasible
proposal ... maybe the focus should be shifted to an intermediate solution that

would give homosexuals most of what they want." Id.
291 Id. at 1742.
292 id.

Baehr v. Miike, 1999 LEXIS 391 (Haw. 1999). The constitution was
amended by adding the following words, "The legislature shall have the power
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." Id. at *5.
294 Id. at 6-7.
295 See id.
293
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custody or to adopt a child. 2 5 Gay couples are considered
criminals under some state sodomy statutes for engaging in
homosexual conduct. 7 Since Justice White's opinion in Bowers
v. Hardwick2 9 that there is "no connection between family,
marriage or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity
on the other."299 Homosexuals have been denied all manner of
claims for equal treatment because of the depiction of their lives as
immoral. ' 0
Substantive due process analysis indicates that although the
Supreme Court has found that parents have a fundamental liberty
interest in the care and custody of their child,3 ' the Supreme Court
has not expressly stated that individuals have the right to adopt
children.3m Nor has the Supreme Court held that homosexuals are
denied the equal protection of the laws in relation to adoption.
Individual state constitutions may grant homosexuals greater
rights than they are granted under the federal Constitution, but case
law indicates that historical misconceptions and judicial biases
play a large role in adoption determinations. Although it might be
argued that change is occurring at the state level, this is not
indicative of change at the federal level in the near future.
Notably, homosexuals wishing to adopt have been gaining ground
in the legal establishment, as the American Bar Association
adopted a resolution in 1999 in support of the right to adopt for
30 3
gays.
296 See generally, Custody Denials to Parents in
Same-sex Relationships: An
Equal ProtectionAnalysis, 102 HARv. L. Rsv. 617 (1989).

See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947

(1980).
478 U.S. 186 (1986). Hardwick brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of the Georgia statute that criminalizes sodomy. Id. The Court
ultimately held that the statute was constitutional. Id.
2Id.

at 191.

= See e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
classifications based on sexual orientation are not entitled to strict scrutiny).
30' Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
= Id.
303 Jeffrey G. Gibson, Lesbian and Gay Prospective Adoptive Parents: The
Legal Battle, 26 HUMAN RIGHTs 7 (Spring 1999). The ABA resolution provides
in pertinent part that "the American Bar Association supports the enactment of
laws and implementation of public policy that provide that sexual orientation
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Returning to the triangle used as an illustration of the family
unit, the preceding analysis indicates that the vertices between a
biological parent and her child is easily formed by virtue of the
biological relationship. In some states, such as New York, which
allow co-parent adoption without severing the biological bond
between the child and its natural parent, a connection may also be
formed between the child and its adoptive parent.304 Furthermore,
in New York, the adoptive parent may be a homosexual partner of
the biologifal parent. 3°5 In any case, it is possible to create a
vertex between the child and its natural parent and one between the
child and its adoptive parent. However, the base of the triangle,
which in a heterosexual relationship is formed by virtue of
marriage, is lacking in the homosexual relationship.
Thus, marriage is the bond that needs to be recognized legally in
order to complete the homosexual family unit. In all states,
marriage between two people of the same sex is not recognized,
and although Hawaii recognizes a "simulacrum of marriage,, 300 the
sanctity attached to marriage is still lacking.

Stella Lellos*

shall not be a bar to adoption when the adoption is determined to be in the best
interest of the child." Id.
o N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1998).
30
Id.
306 Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian
Family Values by a 'Simulacrum of Marriage,' 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699
(1998).
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